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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
V. 
1977 CADILLAC 2 DOOR SEDAN 
DEVILLE; EIGHT THOUSAND TWO 
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR DOLLARS 
AND TEN CENTS UNITED STATES 
CURRENCY, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 930732-CA 
Priority No. 15 
Defendant/Appellant 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is made pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. This court has appellate jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Title 78, Part 
2a, Section 3(2) of the Utah Code (1953 as amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal of right from a denial of the claimant's motion to set aside 
judgement by default. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
This case presents three issues for review: First, did the trial court employ the 
proper procedures in entering a forfeiture judgement? Second, did the trial court 
commit error in applying the wrong legal standard to the motion to set aside the 
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judgement? Third, did the trial court commit error in entering findings of fact in 
support of the motion to withdraw judgement that were not supported by the record? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appeals from a motion made pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 ( Utah 
App. 1989). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(f) through (h). 
(f) After 20 days following service of a complaint or 
petition for release, the court shall examine the record and 
if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the complainant 
or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support 
of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the property 
as the court determines. If the county attorney has not 
filed an answer to a petition for release and the court 
determines from the evidence that the petitioner is not 
entitled to a recovery of the property, it shall enter an order 
directing the county attorney to answer the petition within 
ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court 
shall order the release of the property to the petitioner 
entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition 
appears of record at the end of 20 days, the court shall set 
the matter for hearing within 20 days. At this hearing all 
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of 
release of the property following the state's evidence for 
forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of 
the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as it determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of 
any other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under this 
act or the laws of this state. 
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Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgement, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct 
of an adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons 
in an action has not been personally served upon the 
defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgement is void; (6) 
the judgement has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgement upon which it is based has been 
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgement should have prospective application; or 
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgement. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or {4), not 
more than 3 months after the judgement, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgement 
or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power 
of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgement, order or proceeding or to set aside 
a judgement for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgement shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be 
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) 
generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by 
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resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. 
(c) When discretionary, a court may take judicial 
notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the 
necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon 
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the 
propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the 
matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the 
request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, 
the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any 
fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a forfeiture proceeding in the fourth judicial district court 
in and for Millard County, Utah. A forfeiture complaint, notice of seizure and intent 
to forfeit were filed in the fourth district court for Millard County on January 11, 
1989. (R. 1-5) An answer was filed on behalf of appellant on January 27, 1989. (R. 
12-13) Trial was originally scheduled for February 28, 1993. (R. 16) The trial was 
continued (R. 21) and ultimately rescheduled to January 30, 1991. (R. 34) Neither 
appellant nor counsel appeared on that date. (R. 38) Findings of fact and conclusions 
of law were originally entered on January 30, 1991. (R. 44-46) Amended findings 
of fact and conclusions of law were entered on February 8, 1991. (R. 50-52) A 
judgement of forfeiture was entered against appellant on January 30, 1991. (R. 44-
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46) On July 22, 1992, appellant made a motion to set aside the default judgement. 
(R. 53-54) That motion was denied after a hearing. (R. 91-92) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 29, 1988, an automobile in which appellant was riding was 
stopped at a roadblock on Interstate 15 in Millard County, Utah. (R. 51) Appellant 
was charged and convicted of the offense of possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute. That conviction was reversed on appeal because the 
roadblock was found to violate the fourth amendment. State v. Small. 819 P.2d 129 
(Utah App.) QSH. den. 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). Appellant had originally retained 
Sumner J. Hatch to represent him in the criminal case. Mr. Hatch was replaced on 
the appeal by appellant's present counsel. 
Mr. Hatch was also retained by appellant to represent appellant's claim with 
respect to the forfeiture complaint that was the basis of this case. Mr. Hatch filed an 
answer to the complaint on January 27, 1989. (R. 12-13) The case was originally 
scheduled for trial February 28, 1990. It was continued and ultimately tried January 
30, 1991. (R. 34) Neither appellant nor Mr. Hatch appeared at the trial. (R. 38) In 
August, 1990, Mr. Hatch began to suffer from short term memory loss. (R. 85) That 
condition ultimately resulted in Mr. Hatch resigning from the practice of law. That 
occurred in January, 1993. (R. 85) Appellant was not notified of the trial date or the 
entry of the judgement in the instant case until June, 1992. (R. 70) That was done 
because Stephen R. McCaughey reviewed Mr. Hatch's files due to Mr. Hatch's 
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inability to practice law. (R. 63) In doing so, Mr. McCaughey discovered that 
judgement had been entered in the instant case. (R. 62-64) 
The appellant was notified of the situation by Mr. McCaughey (R 62-64). A 
motion to set aside the judgement was made. (R. 53-54) After a hearing on the 
motion, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. 91-92). The 
trial court found that the representations related to Mr. Hatch's condition were true. 
However, the motion was denied because the court found that appellant was aware 
of Mr. Hatch's deteriorated mental condition and he chose not to seek new counsel. 
(R. 92) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court failed to follow the procedures required by statute in a forfeiture 
case. The trial court improperly took judicial notice of the evidence introduced at the 
related criminal trial. Since the judicial notice was taken improperly, no evidence was 
introduced in support of the judgement of forfeiture as required by statute. 
The trial court applied an improper standard in determining appellant's motion 
to withdraw the judgement made pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). If the appropriate 
standard had been applied, the trial court would have withdrawn the judgement. 
The trial court's finding that appellant was aware of Mr. Hatch's inability to 
practice law was clearly erroneous. There was no evidence introduced at the hearing 
on the motion to withdraw the judgement that would support such a finding. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE IMPROPER TAKING OF JUDICIAL NOTICE RENDERED 
THE FORFEITURE JUDGEMENT INVALID AS IT WAS NOT 
DONE PURSUANT TO THE PROCEDURES REQUIRED BY 
STATUTE. 
On the date set for the forfeiture trial neither of the claimants nor their counsel 
appeared to represent their respective interests. (R. 50) The trial court took judicial 
notice of the evidence that was introduced at the claimant's criminal trial. (R. 50) 
Based on the judicial notice and the pleadings the court entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. No transcripts of the criminal trial were introduced into evidence 
as part of the request to take judicial notice. A judgement was then entered for the 
plaintiff. (R. 47) At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the default judgement, 
counsel argued that the procedure employed failed to meet the requirements of the 
forfeiture statue, Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13 (1953 as amended). (Tr. 6) 
The forfeiture statue has no provision for a default judgement. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-13(9)(f) (1953 as amended) relates to the procedure to be taken when there 
is no answer on file to the state's forfeiture complaint. The relevant portion of that 
statue provides: 
After 20 days following service of a complaint or 
petition for release, the court shall examine the record and 
if no answer is on file, the court shall allow the complainant 
or petitioner an opportunity to present evidence in support 
of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the property 
as the court determines.... 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-13(9)(g) describes the procedures to be employed when 
there is an answer on file to a forfeiture complaint. That statute provides: 
When an answer to a complaint or petition appears 
of record at the end of 20 days, the court shall set the 
matter for hearing within 20 days. At this hearing all 
interested parties may present evidence of their rights of 
release of the property following the state's evidence for 
forfeiture. The court shall determine by a preponderance of 
the evidence the issues in the case and order forfeiture or 
release of the property as it determines.[emphasis added] 
This statute clearly requires that the state put on evidence before a forfeiture 
judgement may be entered. 
The issue that this court needs to address is whether the taking of judicial 
notice in the instant case was appropriate. If it was not appropriate, then the 
judgement of forfeiture was obtained improperly. This would require that the 
judgement be reversed. Judicial notice is described in Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (U.R.Ev.). That rule states, 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially notice fact must be one not 
subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or 
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, 
whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if 
requested by a party and supplied with the necessary 
information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely 
request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of 
taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. 
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In the absence of prior notice, the request may be made 
after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken in 
any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the 
courts hall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact 
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct 
the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as 
conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
This court has recognized that Rule 201 may be used to allow a trial court to 
take judicial notice of evidence previously introduced in a court proceeding. Riche v. 
Riche. 784 P.2d 265 (Utah App. 1989). However, this holding was subject to a 
number of restrictions. First, the evidence must be entered in a prior proceeding in 
the same case. Second, this court held that there was no error in refusing to take 
judicial notice when the transcript of the prior hearing was not provided. 
The taking of judicial notice in this case was improper. The criminal and 
forfeiture cases do not constitute the same case as discussed in Riche. Although the 
cases may share the same factual basis, they are independent of each other. Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-13(h) (1953 as amended), states, 
Proceedings of this section are independent of any other 
proceeding, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the 
laws of this state. 
This case also fails to meet the second requirement of Riche. There was no transcript 
of the hearing provided to be part Of the court record. A transcript is necessary to 
meet the requirement of U.R.Ev. 201(b)(2) that the fact be capable of ready and 
accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
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The judicial notice taken in this case failed to meet the requirements of U.R.Ev. 
201. Consequently, the evidence was inadmissible. The judgement was entered 
without meeting the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9)(g) (1953 as 
amended). Consequently, the judgement is not valid. It should be reversed and the 
case remanded to the district court with an order that the court take evidence on the 
forfeiture issue. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE WRONG LEGAL 
STANDARD IN ADDRESSING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW JUDGEMENT. 
Appellant moved the trial court to set aside the judgement pursuant to U.R.C.P. 
60(b)(7). This motion was based on the ineffectiveness or incompetence of 
claimant's trial counsel. The trial court ruled that it had broad discretion in ruling on 
such issues. The court cited Birch v. Birch, supra, as authority for that proposition. 
In so ruling, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard. The Birch case addresses 
the standard of review on appeal. The abuse of discretion test is different from that 
used to evaluate issues raised pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7). This court had 
previously adopted a three part test for courts to employ to determine whether relief 
is justified pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7): First, the basis for the motion must be 
something other than those listed in U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) through (6). Second, the 
alleged basis for the motion justifies relief. Third, the motion must be made within a 
reasonable time. 
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If the trial court had applied this three part test, appellant's motion would have 
been granted. As for the first requirement, the provisions of U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) 
through (6) are inapplicable to a claim of counsel's ineffectiveness or incompetence. 
That rule provides: 
Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgement, order or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for any 
cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; (5) the 
judgement is void; (6) the judgement has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgement upon which it 
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgement should have 
prospective application. 
None of these relate to a situation where counsel's ineffectiveness or incompetence 
prevents him from acting as counsel. 
The second issue requires a determination of whether the alleged basis for the 
motion justifies relief. Clearly, trial counsel failed to provide competent counsel as 
required by Rule 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.1 A violation 
1Those rules provide: 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
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of these rules may not in and of itself merit the setting aside of a judgement. 
However, in the case at bar, Mr. Hatch's mental and physical state, combined with 
his failure to communicate with his client put appellant in a situation where he 
effectively had no counsel. This is clearly distinguishable from the situation where 
counsel makes a mistake or neglects an obligation. 
The court in Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Center of Beaver County. Inc., 487 
Pa. 266, 409 A.2d 343 (1979), recognized this distinction. In that case, the court 
considered a motion to set aside a judgement which was entered against the plaintiff 
following the suspension of her counsel from practice. The plaintiff was not notified 
by her counsel of his suspension. The motion to reopen the judgement was not filed 
until approximately six months after judgement was entered in favor of the defendant. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to 
a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation. 
Rule 1.3. Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client. 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation. 
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After considering the circumstances giving rise to the entry of judgement, the court 
stated: 
We believe, however, that much more than neglect by 
[plaintiff's attorney] is involved; here, [the attorney] could 
not have participated in the argument of preliminary 
objections had he desired to do so, as an order of this court 
prevented him form practicing law. Under all of these 
facts, we can find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in 
opening the judgement originally entered in appellee's 
favor. 409 A.2d at 345. 
In Crews v. Houston County Department of Pensions and Security. 358 So.2d 
451 (Ala. 1978), the court held that the procedural due process guarantees of the 
fourteenth amendment include the right to effective assistance of counsel. In Crews, 
the court noted that effective assistance of counsel does not require that a lawyer be 
infallible. Rather, the test is whether an examination of the entire record 
demonstrates that a fair trial was afforded. In the instant case, the cognitive 
disabilities suffered by Mr. Hatch resulted in the denial of the assistance of counsel. 
Consequently, the basis for the motion to vacate the judgement did justify the relief 
that was sought. 
The final factor to consider in U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7) is the reasonableness of the 
time in which the motion is made. The amended findings of fact and conclusion of 
law were entered on February 8, 1991. Appellant learned that the judgement had 
been entered against him in this case in June, 1992. (R 69-70) The motion to set 
aside the default judgement was made on July 22, 1992. (R. 53-54) The time period 
from February, 1991, to June, 1992, cannot be attributable to the appellant. Counsel 
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had received the information regarding the trial and the judgement, but failed to 
communicate it to appellant. 
In a similar situation, the state supreme court allowed relief from a judgement 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60 (b)(7). In Stewart v. Sullivan. 29 Ut. 2d 156, 506 P.2d 74 
(1973), the motion was made one year after the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint 
and some nine months after plaintiff learned of the dismissal. Plaintiff's counsel had 
been suspended from the practice of law two months after the dismissal. The court 
held that U.R.C.P. 60 (b)(7) was sufficiently broad to set aside its prior order. 
In this case, the motion was made within a matter of weeks from the date that 
appellant learned of the dismissal. Based on the ineffective manner in which his 
previous counsel had assisted him, the time period prior to the date of his learning of 
the dismissal should not be attributable to appellant. Consequently, the third part of 
the test to determine a motion pursuant to U.R.C.P. 60(b)(7) has been met. 
The failure to apply the proper legal standard to determine the appellant's 
motion is clearly an abuse of discretion. That error was prejudicial. If the proper 
standard had been applied, the judgement would have been vacated. The trial court's 
order denying appellant's motion to set aside the judgement should be reversed and 
the case remanded to the district court with an order that the motion be reconsidered 
and the proper legal standard applied. 
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POINT III 
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT WAS AWARE OF MR. 
HATCH'S MENTAL DISABILITY WAS CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
In ruling on appellant's motion to set aside the judgement, the court did not 
enter specific findings of fact. However, a written ruling was made. (R. 91-92) In 
that ruling the court indicated that the evidence relating to Mr. Hatch's condition was 
truthful. (R. 92) However, the court also indicated "....Mr. Small was aware of his 
attorney's condition and simply chose not to find other counsel to protect his interest 
in the forfeited property." (R. 92) There was nothing in the record from which the 
district court judge could draw this conclusion. 
In reviewing a trial court's finding of facts, the appellate court must apply a 
clearly erroneous standard. U.R.C.P. 52(a). A finding is clearly erroneous if it is 
against the great weight of the evidence. State v. Burke, 839 P.2d 850 (Utah App. 
1992). When a finding of fact is contested, the party doing so must marshal all of 
the evidence that was introduced to show that the finding cannot be supported. 
Cornish Town v. Koller. 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). 
The evidence introduced at the hearing on the motion to withdraw the 
judgement consisted of for affidavits. The affidavit of Stephen R. McCaughey (R. 62-
64) indicated that Mr. Hatch's health and mental condition had begun to degenerate 
in the summer of 1990. At that time Mr. McCaughey began to assume responsibility 
for some of Mr. Hatch's clients. However, Mr. McCaughey was not made aware of 
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this forfeiture case and its status until June of 1992. At that time he notified the 
client and took measures to have the judgement vacated. 
The appellant, Lemuel Small, submitted an affidavit. (R. 69-70) He indicated 
that he retained Mr. Hatch to represent him in the criminal and the forfeiture cases in 
the Fourth District Court. In doing so, he relied upon Mr. Hatch to represent his 
interests. Appellant indicated that he was not given notice of the trial or the 
judgement in the forfeiture case until June, 1992. He further indicated that he was 
not aware of Mr. Hatch's physical or mental problems until June, 1992. 
Sumner Hatch's affidavit described his mental problems relative to memory 
loss. (R. 85-86) He indicated that in October, 1990, he effectively quit practicing 
law. He stated that with respect to this case, he did not take any action on the 
notices that were sent nor did he contact his client. D. Gilbert Athay submitted an 
affidavit corroborating the information relative to Mr. Hatch's mental condition. (R. 88-
90) He had known Mr. Hatch for 25 years and officed next door to him for 12 years. 
Mr. Athay described the symptoms relative to the obvious problem with Mr. Hatch's 
memory loss. 
There is nothing in these affidavits giving rise to the inference that appellant 
was aware of Mr. Hatch's condition, but allowed him to continue as counsel of record 
in spite of that problem. Appellant did change counsel for his criminal appeal. 
However, there is nothing in that fact to indicate that appellant was aware of Mr. 
Hatch's mental problems. The finding that appellant was aware of Mr. Hatch's 
16 
condition is against the great weight of the evidence and is clearly erroneous. The 
trial court's order should be reversed and the judgement should be ordered vacated. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks to have the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw the 
judgement reversed. Appellant further seeks to have the case remanded to the district 
court with an order requiring that the judgement be set aside and a new trial ordered. 
DATED this day of January, 1994. 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this day of January, 1994, to: 
Dexter L. Anderson 
Deputy Millard County Attorney 
750 South Highway 99 
Fillmore, UT 84631 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MILLARD, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
n - 1977 CADILLAC 2 DOOR 
SEDAN DEVILLE VIN # 
6D47S70195013 
n - EIGHT THOUSAND TWO 
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR 
DOLLARS AND TEN CENTS 
($8,234.10) 
Defendant. 
RULING ON CLAIMANT SMALL'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT 
BY DEFAULT 
Case No. 8446 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
This matter came before the Court on claimant SmalTs Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
by Default. The Court, having reviewed the filed, read the memoranda of counsel, and 
being fully advised in the premises, now enters the following: 
RULING 
1. Claimant Small's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is denied. 
DISCUSSION 
Mr, Small, one of the claimants in this case, requests this Court to set aside forfeiture 
order in this case under Rule 60 (b)(5) and/or (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part: "On motion and 
legal representative from a final judgment for the following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment is 
void; . . . (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Mr. Small claims that the judgment is void because of a violation of the claimants due 
process rights. A judgment will only be considered void if the court lacked jurisdiction 
before entering judgment. Mr. Small has not alleged that the Court lacked jurisdiciton over 
the res. As a result, the Coun will not set aside the judgment based on Rule 60 (b)(5). 
Mr. Small also argues that the forfeiture order should be set aside because of his 
attorney's incapacitation and subsequent ineffectiveness. The trial coun has broad discretion 
in ruling on a motion for relief from judgment under Subdivision (b), and its determination 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). Although the Coun has no reason to believe that the representations concerning 
Mr. Hatch's condition are untrue, the Coun also believes that Mr. Small was aware of his 
attorney's condition and simply chose not to find other counsel to protect his interest in the 
forfeited propeny. Accordingly, the Coun declines to exercise its discretion and set aside 
the judgment. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this day of . 1993 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Stephen R. McCauehev F«i 
FILED 
COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFIfO CLERK 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
AUG - 6 1992 
MILLARD COUNTY 
Stephen R. McCaughey - #2149 
G. Fred Metos - #2250 
MCCAUGHEY & METOS 
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
^k ~ 
.CLERK 
.DEPUTY] 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs. 
1977 2 DOOR SEDAN, 
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight 
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four 
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10), 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY 
Case No. 8446 
Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Stephen R. McCaughey, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
says; 
1. He is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah who maintains an office in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Your affiant has personal knowledge of the facts set forth 
below. 
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3. At all times pertinent to Claimant's Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment by Default, he maintained his office at 72 East 400 South, 
Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
4. Sumner J. Hatch also maintained an office at that same 
address on an "office sharing11 basis. 
5. Beginning apparently two years ago, your affiant became 
aware that Sumner J. Hatch experienced both short and long term 
memory loss. 
6. At about that same time, your affiant, during conver-
sations with Mr. Hatch, became aware that Mr. Hatch's reasoning 
ability and logic were severally impaired. 
7. During that same time, Mr. Hatch requested that your 
affiant assume the representation of some of Hatch's clients in 
various matters. However, Mr. Hatch did not request that your 
affiant assume the representation of Lemuel T. Small in the above 
entitled action. 
8. Sumner J. Hatch effectively discontinued the practice of 
law approximately 18 months ago. 
9. While reviewing Mr. Small's file in June of 1992, your 
affiant discovered the Notice of Setting, which served to schedule 
this matter for trial on January 30, 1992. 
11. Your affiant then contacted the Clerk of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in and for Millard County to learn the 
2 
disposition at the time of trial. Your affiant was informed that 
Judgment had been entered in favor of Plaintiff. 
12. Thereafter, your affiant notified Lemuel T. Small that 
the matter had been set for trial, that the trial date had passed, 
that Mr. Hatch did not appear at trial and that Judgment had 
entered in favor of Plaintiff. 
13. Coincidentally, your affiant had been retained by Lemuel 
T. Small to represent his interests in the matter of State of Utah 
vs. Small, then pending before the Utah Court of Appeals. Oral 
argument was heard in that matter on February 28, 1992. 
DATED this ^ day of August, 1992. r 
S t ^ t f e n R. McCau^hey 
Subscr ib^_« id__swQrn^to - b e f o r e me t h i s August day of 
1992 . 's&r^ LAREE J PEARSON * 
Notary Public * 
STATE OF UTAH 
<L. 
My Commissi ^VfiOBWi. BP-»*r : 24.1993] 
>a«msLC.uTwni 
NotaryJPUBI 
Residing: 
3ZMAM?h~ 
3 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on the ^f day of August, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Stephen R. McCaughey 
was mailed, in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Dexter L. Anderson 
Millard County Chief Deputy Attorney 
760 South Highway 99 
Star Route, Box 52 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
Qzs~4Ltoe^_y 
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« w n r CLERK & Ex-omao CLERK 
•"WSTRICTmngT 
AUG 2 I 1992 
Stephen R. McCaughey - #2149 
G. Fred Metos - #2250 
MCCAUGHEY & METOS 
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MJUAIfo COUNTY 
.CLERK 
n c w i T V | 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
1977 2 DOOR SEDAN, 
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight 
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four 
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10), 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
LEMUEL T. SMALL 
Case No. 8446 
Judge 
) 
:ss. 
STATE OF MONTANA 
COUNTY OF ) 
Lemuel T. Small, being first duly sworn, deposes and says; 
1. He is a Claimant in the above entitled action. 
2. Your affiant resides in the State of Montana. 
3. He has personal knowledge of the facts set forth below. 
4. Shortly after September 29, 1988, he retained Sumner J. 
Hatch to represent his interests in connection with pending 
criminal charges and in connection with the seizure and pending 
06. 
forfeiture of the sum of $8,234.10 and a certain 1977 Cadillac 
automobile. 
5. Your affiant reasonably relied on Sumner J. Hatch to 
represent his interests. 
6. Your affiant did not have any notice, until apparently two 
months ago that Sumner J. Hatch suffered from various physical 
ailments which caused him to suffer short and long term memory 
loss, a loss of reasoning ability and other cognitive deficits. 
7. Your affiant was not notified by Sumner J. Hatch, or by 
any other person, prior to the time of trial that trial had been 
scheduled for January 30, 1991. 
8. Your affiant did not learn that Judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff had entered in this matter until apparently two months 
ago. 
9. Your affiant did not learn that Sumner J. Hatch had failed 
to appear on his behalf and represent his interests until apparent-
ly two months ago. 
10. Your affiant claims an interest in the sum of $8,234.10, 
forfeited to the State of Utah by virtue of this Court's Default 
Judgment. 
DATED this /^ day of August, 1992. 
Lemuel T. Small 
Affiant 
2 
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1992. 
1 ~>~L Subscribed and sworn to before me this August day of /J> , ±h 
My Commission Expires: 
ttbtary Public 
Residing: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on the frD day of August, 1992, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Lemuel T. Small was 
mailed, in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Dexter L. Anderson 
Millard County Chief Deputy Attorney 
760 South Highway 99 
Star Route, Box 52 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
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Stephen R. McCaughey - 2149 
G. Fred Metos - 2250 
McCAUGHEY & METOS 
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
1977 2 DOOR SEDAN, 
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight 
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four 
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10) 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
Case No. 8446 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Sumner J . Hatch, being first duly sworn upon my oath do state the following to 
be true and correct to the best of my knowledge: 
1. Beginning approximately August of 1990, I began suffering short term 
memory loss, which has continued to increase in severity. 
2. Because of my loss of memory, I resigned from the practice of law in 
January, 1993- However, I effectively quit practicing law in October of 1990. 
08o 
3. I have no memory of ever receiving any notices involving the forfeiture in 
this matter. 
4. Beginning approximately August of 1990, I received several notices of 
pending actions in cases in which I was counsel. I took no action whatsoever because 
of my loss of memory. 
5. I never contacted my client, Lemuel T. Small, regarding any notices sent out 
by the court in this matter. 
DATED this % day of March, 1993. 
'<**-,» ; ^ v 
SUMNER J. HAT 
Affiant 
CH 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this 2 ^ d a y of March, 1993 
«1W» I . 4 M M | 
Sfi!2 LuhO ClTy. I i . , l H 
IW Commission Expires 
December 10.1996 
State of Utah 
4 4 & 
ic 
t Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
\?\\b\q(* 
2 -
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this /?4Hlav of March, 1993, to: 
DEXTER L. ANDERSON 
Millard County Deputy Attorney 
750 South Highway 99 
Star Route, Box 52 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
- 3 -
OQ ' 
Stephen R. McCaughey - 2149 
G. Fred Metos - 2250 
McCAUGHEY & METOS 
Attorneys for Claimant Lemuel T. Small 
72 East Fourth South, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-6474 
1
 FILED 
COUNTY CLERK & EX-OFFICIO CLERK 
OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
MPR 6 
MILLARD COuNT/ 
~f 3F 7 -
n\ \ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
MILLARD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
1977 2 DOOR SEDAN, 
VIN #6D47S70195013 and Eight 
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-Four 
Dollars Ten Cents ($8,234.10) 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Case No. 8446 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, D. Gilbert Athay, being first duly sworn upon my oath do state the following to 
be true and correct to the best of my knowledge: 
1 . I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Utah. I have known 
Sumner J . Hatch for the past 25 years. I have had an office next to Sumner J. Hatch for 
approximately 12 years. 
08G 
2. Beginning approximately August of 1990, it became obvious to me that 
Sumner J. Hatch was having memory loss problems. Some examples are: 
a. I observed that he was unable to remember names of clients and 
prosecutors. 
b. He would ask me the same questions everyday with no memory of 
the answer I had previously given him. 
c. He would continually sit is his office for hours on end staring out the 
window. 
3. In my opinion, Sumner J. Hatch was not competent to be practicing law and 
representing clients for at least the last three years. 
DATED this A i r d a y of March, 1993. 
\s(AJlh«J: 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE me this 7/\ day of March, 1993 
Notary Pu!)lb • 
AMY K. CARLSON I 
72 East 4G0 South *320 f 
Saft lake City, Utah e4111 ! 
My Commission Expires • 
December 10,1995 h 
StoteofUtah J 
L 
NOTARY PUBVJC 
Residing at $alt\Lake City, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
08,"/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed/hand delivered 
on this ^ ^ a y of March, 1993, to: 
DEXTER L. ANDERSON 
Millard County Deputy Attorney 
750 South Highway 99 
Star Route, Box 52 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
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